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 My dissertation consists of three essays that examine the role of fixed factors in 
multi-sector neoclassical growth models, specifically the role of population density in 
causing the onset of industrialization. 
 The first paper examines the question of why industrialization occurred first in 
China rather than England. Although industrialization first occurred in England, it is 
often thought that China, not England, was the world leader in technology at the time. 
Yet China did not industrialize until 150 years after England and nearly a century after 
less advanced European countries. This puzzle is examined in a two-sector model with 
competing agrarian and industrial production technologies. I find that when differences in 
population density across countries are accounted for, this delayed industrialization by 
China is the result of decreasing returns to population density in the agrarian technology 
and is consistent with the theory. 
vi 
 In the second paper, the importance of total factor productivity (TFP) in causing 
industrialization is examined. TFP has long been thought to be the driving force behind 
industrialization. However, such an explanation cannot adequately account for the 
staggered timing of industrialization across countries. By accounting for differences in 
population density, a heterogeneity previously unexplored in the literature, I can account 
for 49-51 percent of the movement toward industrialization in the two sector overlapping 
generations model employed by Hansen and Prescott (2002). 
 The third paper presents a sequential competitive equilibrium to solve an infinite 
horizon two-sector neoclassical growth mode where the two sectors are chosen to 
represent the agrarian and manufacturing sectors of the economy. In this framework, 
industrialization is seen to be the relaxing of the non-negativity constrain on the 
manufacturing sector. It is seen that every country possesses a critical population density 
upon which it will transition from using solely an agrarian production technology to 
employing both agrarian and manufacturing technologies. This transition is result of a 
discrete change in the decision to invest in manufacturing capital. Furthermore, the ability 
of agents to anticipate industrialization is shown to increase the rate of capital 
accumulation and hasten the onset of the manufacturing sector.  
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 Although industrialization first occurred in England, it is often thought that China, 
not England, was the world leader in technology at the time. Yet China did not 
industrialize until 150 years after England and nearly a century after less advanced 
European countries. This puzzle is examined in a two-sector model with competing 
agrarian and industrial production technologies. I find that when differences in population 
density across countries are accounted for, the delayed industrialization of China is the 
result of decreasing returns to population density in the agrarian technology and 
consistent with the theory. 
Keywords: economic development, population density, industrialization 






 Although industrialization first occurred in England, it is often thought that China, 
not England, was the world leader in technology at the time. Yet China did not 
industrialize until 150 years after England and nearly a century after less advanced 
European countries. 
 Models accounting for this staggered industrialization generally attribute this to 
significantly lower levels of total factor productivity (TFP) in China, which is at odds 
with the data as seen in Table 1.1. These different proxies for living standards have been 
employed as measures of productivity since present-day measures of TFP were not 
collected in the eighteenth century. 
Table 1.1: Measures for TFP, Circa 1750-18001 
  
Real GNP per 
Capita 
Real Wages of 
Farm Workers, 
CPI Deflator 










England 215 0.011 9961 21.0 2349 
China 210 0.009 9996 22.5 2386 
 
 While it is impossible to definitively declare a technology leader at the onset of 
industrialization, these measures have lead economists and historians to conclude that 
China may have held a slight lead over England at the time.3 
 The reason this is puzzling is that industrialization is generally viewed as a time-
dependant event; one in which more technologically advanced countries industrialize at 
                                                
1 Data obtained from Pomeranz (205) (column 1), Bairoch (1981) (column 2), and Allen (2005) (columns 
3-5). 
2 Based upon the farming of rice in China and wheat in England. 
3 According to Bairoch (1981): “It is very likely that, in the middle of the eighteenth century, the average 
standard of living in Europe was a bit lower than that of the rest of the world. This was due to the high level 
achieved by the Chinese civilization, and the relative importance of that country in the rest of the world 
(some 36 per cent). Till the years 1815-20 there was still a parity of average income levels between the two 
regions.” Similar statements expressed by Pomeranz (2000), Prescott (1998), Allen (2005), Hansen and 
Prescott (2002), etc. 
3 
an earlier date. Parente and Prescott (2000, 2004) subscribe to this view and explain 
delays in industrialization by an institutional failure of countries to adopt available 
technology. Similarly, North (1981) argues that it was more efficient markets and 
institutions that caused England to industrialize first. However, Keller and Shiue (2004) 
show that such differences were present only following industrialization. 
 In an attempt to explain China’s failure to industrialize concurrently with 
England, this paper argues that population density is a more appropriate measure to 
predict when industrialization should occur. Due to a fixed land supply the agrarian 
technology exhibits decreasing returns, resulting in a critical population density at which 
it becomes profitable to begin shifting to a manufacturing technology that is independent 
of land. 
 The table below examines a cross section of countries with varying population 
densities at a given point in time. It shows a positive relationship between population 
density and the level of industrialization in a country.  
 Almost three quarters of all countries with a population density below 4 persons 
per square kilometer have less than 15% of GDP attributable to manufacturing. At the 
same time, 57% of countries with a population density above 256 persons per square 



























0-4 73% 20% 7% 15 
4-16 57% 27% 17% 30 
16-64 67% 29% 5% 42 
64-256 35% 31% 35% 26 
>256 14% 29% 57% 7 
All Countries 55% 28% 18% 120 
 
 If industrialization is dependent on population density rather than time, then the 
comparable levels of TFP between England and China should have resulted in 
industrialization occurring at similar population densities. Table 1.3 confirms that this 
was the case; the population densities of China and England were almost identical upon 
their respective industrializations. Further affirming this view, France and Germany, 
countries with lower levels of TFP at the time, did not industrialize until attaining higher 
population densities.  
Table 1.3: Population Density at Industrialization5 
Country 
Land Mass 
(million sq. km) 
Population Density 






(persons/ sq. km) 
England 0.15 61.67 1800 61.67 
China 9.60 34.38 1950 61.46 
France 0.55 52.73 1850 65.45 
Germany 0.36 50.00 1850 75.00 
 
                                                
4 Data obtained from Boserup (1981) and Developing Countries and Level of Development (1975) 
5 Industrialization determined by initial increase in GDP per capita taken from Table 5.2 in Lucas (2002) 
and Summers et al. (2002). Population and landmass are obtained by linear interpolation from McEvedy 
and Jones (1978). 
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 Previously, China’s lag behind England represented a puzzle for the growth 
literature which predicts that initially more technologically advanced countries will 
industrialize earlier than less advanced countries. But a theory that accounts for 
population density would not expect China to industrialize at the same time as England, 
since in 1800, the time of the British Industrial Revolution, the population density of 
China was far below that of England. Instead it would accurately predict the date of the 
Chinese industrial revolution to be a century and a half later when the population density 
of China reached the level of England circa 1800. 
 To address this puzzle, I present a two-sector overlapping generations model with 
agricultural and industrial production technologies identical to those used by Hansen and 
Prescott (2002). In this model, decreasing returns to population density in the agrarian 
sector eventually causes the implementation of the industrial production technology. The 
implications of this model for the timing of industrialization are very accurate.  
 Chapter two explores alternate explanations for industrialization, like Parente and 
Prescott (2000, 2004) and Lucas (2002), and compares the relative importance of each. 
This paper focuses solely on population density to show that when taken into account, the 
case of China and England does not represent a puzzle, but rather a confirmation of two 
sector growth models like Hansen and Prescott (2002). 
 The next section describes the environment while Section III solves the model and 
shows how the inclusion of population density differences can correct for the late 
industrialization of China. Section IV concludes and discusses implications of the results. 
6 
II. Environment 
 The economy is identical to the one described by Hansen and Prescott (2002) and 
Parente and Prescott (2004)6. I am presenting it here for completeness and to expand 
upon the conclusions previously drawn from the model.   
 There are three factors of production in the economy: land, labor, and capital. 













1#µ#" , using capital, labor, and land; and industrial firms 









1#" , using capital and 
labor. Both production technologies produce an identical aggregate good and firms face 
perfectly competitive markets for labor, land, capital, and goods, such that capital 
depreciates fully each period. Therefore, firms solve a static profit maximization 















, where ! j ,0  is the initial level of TFP in sector j = a,m  and ! a = ! m  such 
the growth rate of TFP is identical across sectors prior to industrialization.7 !
i
"[0,1]  
represents the percentage of world TFP that has been absorbed by the manufacturing 
sector of country i . 
 Agents live for two periods and choose labor, investment in capital, and land 
holdings when young and capital when old to maximize lifetime utility. Preferences are 
                                                
6 The overlapping generations specification of Hansen and Prescott (2002) is chosen to prevent capital 
accumulation prior to industrialization. An infinitely lived agent model like Parente and Prescott (2004) 
produces comparable results but lacks the closed form solutions of the simpler framework. 
7 This final specification follows from the calibration in Parente and Prescott (2004) 
7 
discounted by ! < 1  such that lifetime utility of a generation t  agent is represented by 
ln c
t
t( ) + ! ln ct+1
t( ) .  
 In period t , there are N
t
 generation t  young agents, each choosing to divide his 
unit endowment of labor between agrarian labor, n
a,t
, and industrial labor, n
m,t





. The generation t  young agent divides his labor income 
between consumption, c
t
, land, qtlt+1 , agrarian capital, ka,t+1 , and industrial capital, 
k
m,t+1
. The following period, the generation t  old agent receives r
Ka,t+1
+1! "  for each 
unit of agrarian capital, r
Km,t+1
+1! "  for each unit of industrial capital, r
L ,t+1
 for each 
unit of land, and sells his land holdings at price q
t+1




 generation t +1 
young agents. 
III. Equilibrium 
 The static maximization decision made each period by the representative agrarian 
firm is 
N



























  (1.1) 
while the decision of the manufacturing firm is 
N


















   (1.2) 





 approach zero, r
L ,t
 approaches zero as well. Assuming firms employ factors when 
indifferent, this zero cost of land in the limit implies that the agrarian sector will always 
8 




a,t{ }! 0  will be infinite, so it must be that Na,t ,Ka,t > 0  and the agrarian firm 
always produces. 
 Conversely, substituting the first order conditions with respect to manufacturing 
capital into the argument of the maximization function, we find that the industrial sector 











          (1.3) 
 Equation (1.3) is the result of Proposition 2, equation (8), of Hansen and Prescott 
(2002). They found a condition on manufacturing TFP, relative to factor prices, upon 
which an economy will industrialize. The contribution of this paper is in showing that 
factor prices are functions of population density and by substituting for factor prices in 
(1.3), it is possible to derive conditions for industrialization on a more fundamental and 
easily measurable state variable: population density.  This revised condition allows the 
staggered timing of industrialization across countries to be explained by differences in 
population densities, a source of heterogeneity not accounted for by Hansen and Prescott 
(2002) or Parente and Prescott (2004). 
 For times when (1.3) does not hold, only the agrarian sector is employed, and the 


















                                                




 is capital per capita, we find that the industrial technology is employed if and 





















       (1.4) 
 To remove capital per capita from (1.4), it is necessary to address the agent’s 










+ kt+1 + qt lt+1 =" t
ct+1
t
= rK ,t+1kt+1 + rL ,t+1 + qt+1( )lt+1
  (1.5) 
 It is not difficult to prove that when the growth rate of agrarian TFP is 
!
a
= "1#(µ+$ ) , there exists an equilibrium in which capital, consumption and output per 
worker are constant. 
 In this balanced growth path, the path to industrialization can be completely 
characterized by two variables, ! a
!
m
( )  and NL( ) , such that the condition for industrialization 
can be rewritten as9 
N
L
( ) ! " a" m( )
t
1#(µ+$ ) " a ,0















  (1.6) 
 To compare the implications of the model with and without accounting for 
differences in population density, I reconstruct the work of Parente and Prescott (2004). 
They argue that all countries industrialize at the same level of manufacturing TFP. To 
generate the differences in manufacturing TFP necessary to account for the staggered 
                                                
9 In chapter two, the full general equilibrium is solved to reduce k
a
 to fundamental parameters. Since the 
value of k
a
 is not needed for the results in this paper, its value is not explored further here. 
10 
timing of industrialization, they introduce a country specific variable, !
i
"[0,1] , that 
represents the percentage of world TFP that has been absorbed by the manufacturing 
sector of country i . Equation (1.6) is modified by substituting in the TFP paths, rewriting 






























  (1.7) 
where the right hand side is assumed to be identical across countries. The result is a 
world in which all countries industrialize at the same level of industrial TFP and !
i
 is 
calibrated to account for differences in the timing. Equation (1.8) corresponds to (4.2) of 




1#(µ+$ )[ ]% i = !
j
"
1#(µ+$ )[ ]% j     (1.8) 
where !
i
 is the year of industrialization of country i .  
 Allowing N0
L
, the initial population density, to vary across countries, causes (1.7) 
to instead imply equality of population density at industrialization, after accounting for 




1" µ+#( ) N0,i
Li( )$i
% i = !
j
1
1" µ+#( ) N0, j
L j( )$ j
% j    (1.9) 
                                                















t  is the population density of country i  at time t . Equation (1.9) 
implies that industrialization should occur at a given population density after adjusting 
for TFP adoption rates. The parameter !
i
 is calibrated to account for such deviations. 
 Using equations (1.8) and (1.9), respectively, we can determine the relative TFP 
adoption rates of China and England that are needed to replicate the timing of 




# china $# england( )( )
1$ µ+%( )
   (1.10) 

















   (1.11) 
 The year of industrialization, !
i
, and the population density at industrialization, 
N!i
L
, of each country follows from Table 1.3, the exogenous parameters µ = .6  and ! = .1  
are taken from Parente and Prescott (2004), and the population growth rate of China 
between 1800 and 1950, !
china
= 1.005 , was derived from McEvedy and Jones (1978). 
 As seen in Table 1.4, taking differences in population density into account 
reverses the implied technology lag of China relative to England from one that is at odds 








Table 1.4: Relative TFP Implied by Timing of Industrialization 
Country 
 
Implied Efficiency  




from (1.8) and (1.10)] 
Implied Efficiency Accounting 




from (1.9) and 
(1.11)] 
England 1.00 .998 
China .793 1.00 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 Ignoring differences in population density across countries leads to the conclusion 
that there is a critical level of TFP at which every country industrializes. However, this 
results in a counterfactual when comparing China and England. 
 By accounting for differences in population density, this case no longer represents 
a contradiction between theory and data. This paper shows that once China’s initial lower 
population density is accounted for, the existing growth theory accurately predicts the 
timing of its industrialization. It is seen is that China did not industrialize concurrently 
with England because it had a significantly lower level of population density in 1800. 
Only once its population density increased, making land a sufficiently scarce resource, 
did manufacturing become a profitable alternative to agriculture in China. It was at this 
point that China industrialized. 
 The use of population density to calibrate the relative absorption of TFP across 
countries should improve the accuracy of previous estimates. Using these results in a 
manner similar to Parente and Prescott (2004) would allow for additional heterogeneity 
between countries, perhaps providing for new explanations of the differing growth rates 
following industrialization. It may be that post-industrial growth paths depend upon the 
13 
ratio of TFP to population density at industrialization. Such lines of research may 
ultimately lend insight into the cause of Asian growth miracles of the 1950’s. 
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Chapter Two 







 Total factor productivity (TFP) has long been thought to be the driving force 
behind industrialization. However, such an explanation cannot adequately account for the 
staggered timing of industrialization across countries. By accounting for differences in 
population density, a heterogeneity previously unexplored in the literature, I can account 
for 49-51 percent of the movement toward industrialization in the two sector overlapping 
generations model employed by Hansen and Prescott (2002). 
Keywords: economic development, population density, TFP, industrialization 








 Total factor productivity (TFP) has long been thought to be the driving force 
behind industrialization. However, such an explanation cannot adequately account for the 
staggered timing of industrialization across countries. In this paper, I explore the role of 
population density in the two-sector overlapping generations unified growth theory of 
Hansen and Prescott (2002) and prove that it is capable of adding the additional 
heterogeneity necessary to match the timing of industrialization. 
 Using an overlapping generations model, I derive a closed form solution for the 
critical population density at which an economy using solely an agrarian production 
technology to one employing both agrarian and manufacturing technologies. For the 
purposes of this paper, industrialization is defined as this transition. Since the critical 
population density is a function of TFP, movement towards industrialization can be 
broken down into two effects: a TFP effect and a population density effect. The relative 
magnitudes of these effects are then compared and the population density effect is found 
to explain 50% of industrialization. 
 The role of population density in industrialization is not novel. Bosserup (1981) 
argued that population density was the cause behind technology growth and more 
recently, Guillo and Sebastian (2004) explored the role that fixed natural resources have 
on a country’s development. However, there is no literature examining the role of 
population density on industrialization, treating TFP and population density 
independently. While this independence does not actually exist, it is still useful to explore 
the different pathways through which variables effect industrialization. 
18 
 The next section describes the environment. Section III removes TFP growth and 
capital from the model and solves this elementary problem to provide intuition. The full 
model is returned to in Section IV where an equilibrium path is found and the results 
from the previous section are shown to be robust to the full specifications. Section V 
takes the model to the data so that the population density and TFP effects can be 
compared. Section VI concludes. 
II. Environment 
 The economy is similar to the overlapping generations model of Hansen and 
Prescott (2002). However, the TFP path is changed to allow for interactions between 
countries.  
 There are three resources in the economy: land, labor, and capital. There are two 













1#µ#" , that uses capital, labor, and land, and industrial firms that have 









1#" , that utilizes only capital 
and labor. Both production technologies produce an identical aggregate good and all 
firms face perfectly competitive markets for labor, land, and capital, where capital 
depreciates fully each period. Each sector can be reduced to a single representative firm. 
There are no fixed costs and no savings technology is available to firms. Therefore, firms 
solve a static maximization problem and operate only in periods where profits are 
nonnegative.  


















" 1 , represents the absorption of technology from abroad for country j  in 
sector i  for period t , and !
a
= "1#(µ+$ )  and !
m
= 1.012  are chosen to match the growth 
paths of Malthusian and Solow economies, respectively. Furthermore it is assumed that 
initially technology is equal across countries, so !
i,t
t
= 1  prior to the industrialization of 
the first country. 
 Agents live for two periods and choose the distribution of labor, investment in 
capital, and land holdings when young and distribution of capital when old to maximize 
lifetime utility. Period utility is discounted in time by ! < 1  such that lifetime utility of a 
generation t  agent is represented by ln c
t
t( ) + ! ln ct+1
t( ) . In period t , there are Nt  
generation t  young agents, each choosing to divide his unit endowment of labor between 
agrarian labor, n
a,t
, and industrial labor, n
m,t





generation t  young agent then divides his labor income between consumption, c
t
, land 
investment, qtlt+1 , agrarian capital, ka,t+1 , and industrial capital, km,t+1 . The following 
period, the generation t  old agent receives r
Ka,t+1
 for each unit of agrarian capital, r
Km,t+1
 
for each unit of industrial capital, r
L ,t+1
 for each unit of land, and sells his land holdings at 
price q
t+1




 generation t +1 young agents. 
 To gain an intuitive understanding of how changing factor endowments are 
capable of generating the transition from an agrarian to an industrialized economy, I first 
show an example without TFP growth or capital. These results are then generalized. 
20 
 
III. Simple Example 




= 1 , and 






















   (2.2) 







     (2.3) 
 What is important to note is that the agrarian technology exhibits decreasing 
returns to scale with respect to labor. 
 Since agents are indifferent between supplying labor to the agrarian or 
manufacturing firm, it is not profitable for the industrial firm to produce when the !
t
" 1 . 
In such cases only the agrarian firm produces and pays workers and land owners the 






. However, once Nt
L
 
becomes sufficiently large, this wage is reduced to one and both technologies are 
employed. Since the industrial firm always pays wages !
m,t
= 1, the agrarian firm can 
never pay a lower wage. 







1!µ , will be referred to as the critical population density. After the critical 
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 Accordingly, wages are falling due to the decreasing returns to population density 



























        (2.5) 
 Conversely, the rental rate of land, r
L ,t
, increases with population density and 




























         (2.6) 
 Output per capita follows wages in decreasing in density before being stabilized 
































    (2.7) 
 The transition of these four variables upon industrialization resemble the data and 
the main discrepancy, the roughly !
4
 shift of wage and output per capita will be corrected 
in the next section with the addition of capital and TFP growth.  
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 In the jargon of classical trade theory, the critical population density represents 
the outer boundary of the diversification cone. Rybcyznski (1955) states that the increase 
of a factor endowment will result in a relative increase in output for the technologies that 
are more intensive in that factor. Figure 2.1 graphically depicts this for the simple model. 
 In Figure 2.1, the unit output isoquants are plotted for both sectors. The line 
tangent to both isoquants is the factor price equalization (FPE) line, the slope of which is 
the absolute value of the ratio of factor prices when both technologies are in use. Because 
it is possible to employ both technologies profitably only when the endowment of the 
economy is within the cone formed by the tangency points of the unit cost isoquants and 
the FPE line, Lerner (1952) refers to this space as the diversification cone. 
 For any factor endowment inside this the cone, the maximum level of output is 
achieved by use of both technologies. For points outside the diversification cone, the 
maximum level of output is achieved by using only one technology; in such cases FPE 
need not hold.  
 Increasing population density causes the economy to enter the diversification 
cone. Once inside the diversification cone, both sectors are employed and FPE holds. 
Industrialization can thus be seen as the movement of a country’s factor endowments into 
the diversification cone. This transition is demonstrated on the diagram from two initial 
endowments, chosen to represent China and England. A higher initial population density 
results in England entering the diversification cone prior to China. 
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 Another way this transition can occur is if the diversification cone widens. This 
occurs when manufacturing TFP increases relative to agrarian TFP. Both causes are seen 
in the data, and Section V compares these two effects. 
 
Figure 2.1: Lerner-Pearce Diagram 
 Regardless of the cause, the abundance of land relative to labor makes the 
agrarian technology more efficient prior to attaining the critical population density. 
However, once population density is sufficiently high, there exists an optimal mix of the 
two production technologies and both sectors are employed. 
IV.  Equilibrium 
 Capital and TFP are now added so that the static maximization problem of the 
representative agrarian firm becomes 
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   (2.8) 
while the problem of the industrial firm becomes 


















    (2.9) 
 I require that that ! (1"!) > # µ  and ! > "  to ensure that the industrial 
technology is more intensive in capital than labor and that its capital to labor intensity 
ratio is higher than that of the agrarian technology.  





 approach zero, r
L ,t
 approaches zero as well. Assuming firms employ factors 
when indifferent, this zero cost of land in the limit implies that the agrarian sector will 
always use all available land. However, so long as L > 0 , the marginal return to labor 
and capital as N
a,t
,K
a,t{ }! 0  will be infinite, so it must be that Na,t ,Ka,t > 0  and the 
agrarian firm always produces. 
 Conversely, substituting the first order conditions with respect to manufacturing 
capital into the argument of the maximization function, we find that the industrial sector 











     (2.10) 
Since this is a static decision, failure to achieve positive profits will result in a shutdown 
of the sector. 
                                                
11 The proof is omitted here since the results follow directly from Hansen and Prescott (2002). 
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 Up to now, all the results have followed directly from Hansen and Prescott 
(2002). The new contribution of this paper begins here with the removal of factor prices 
from (1.3). For times when (1.3) does not hold, only the agrarian sector is employed, and 













, and recognizing that for any given period capital 






is capital per capita, we find that the industrial 





















     (2.11) 
 The maximization problem for the generation t  agent can be described by  
Ut =









+ ka,t+1 + km,t+1 + qt lt+1 ="a,tna,t +"m,tnm,t
ct+1
t
= rKa,t+1ka,t+1 + rKm,t+1km,t+1 + rL ,t+1 + qt+1( )lt+1
0 # ka,t+1,km,t+1,na,t ,nm,t # 1
na,t + nm,t = 1
  (2.12) 
 As discussed in the previous section, agents will only supply labor and capital to 
the highest bidder, so perfect competition amongst firms will equalize factor prices and 












+ kt+1 + qt lt+1 =" t
ct+1
t
= rK ,t+1kt+1 + rL ,t+1 + qt+1( )lt+1
  (2.13) 










     (2.14) 
kt+1 + qt lt+1 =
!
1+ !
" t     (2.15) 
 Given initial conditions, q
0
,ka,0 ,km,0 ,l0{ } , and an aggregate sequence for 






, an equilibrium growth path can be defined by a 
sequence of prices, qt ,! t ,rK ,t ,rL ,t{ }t=0
"













, decisions such that: 
 When (2.11) does not hold in period t +1, generation t  young agents with perfect 
foresight, given prices and allocation in period t , choose n
a,t
= 1 , k
m,t+1












t+1( ) = " a,tKa,t# Na,tµ La,t1!µ!# + " m,tKm,t$ Nm,t1!$   (2.16) 
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1#µ#$     (2.18) 
are equalized across sectors, (2.15) holds, and markets clear. 
 In the special case being examined, where the supply of land is fixed and there are 
constant population and TFP growth rates while only the agrarian technology is 








 and then increasing thereafter. A proof of this is included as 
a supplemental proposition. In the limit as Nt
L( )!" , the economy approaches a balanced 
growth path where capital, consumption, and output per worker grow at a rate of 2% 
annually.12 The TFP growth path, (2.1) was chosen to match these end behaviors while 
being consistent with the empirical findings of Bairoch (1982) and the theoretical results 
of Lucas (2002) that TFP should be equal across sectors, but increase following 
industrialization. 
 For an economy on this growth path, the path to industrialization can be 
completely characterized by two variables, ! a ,t
!
m ,t
( )  and NtL( ) . 
 In Figure 2.2, the key economic variables are plotted against population density 
with TFP equalized across sectors and the remaining exogenous parameter values 
following from Parente and Prescott (2004), assuming 35 year periods: ! = .4 , ! = .1 , 
! = .1 , µ = .6 , ! = .34 .13 ! = .97( )35 . Notice that the findings from the simple economy 
presented in Section III hold with the added benefit that trends in real wage and output 
per capita have rotated so they match the data. Increases to the level of industrial TFP 
growth have the effect of increasing the rate of per capita output, wages, and rental rate of 
capital after industrialization as well as lowering the population density necessary for 
industrialization. Similarly, decreases in industrial TFP growth flatten the graphs and 
increase the critical population density necessary to achieve industrialization. 
                                                
12 This is equivalent to 200% for each 35 year generation. 
13 ! = .34  follows from an annual discount rate of .97. 
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Figure 2.2: Key Variables Plotted Against Population Density 
 
 Conditions that guarantee the occurrence of industrialization are included as a 
supplemental proposition. So long as industrialization does occur, the critical population 
density is unique. Rewriting the assumption of constant population growth as 
t =
ln N L( )! ln N0 L( )
ln "( )
, time dependence can be removed from the problem and the time 
independent critical population density for an economy where !
i
= 1 , to be referred to as 



















1% µ+#( )( )
    (2.19) 
 To this point, the capability of TFP to evolve at different rates across countries 
and sectors has not been explored. Under such assumptions N
L
*  is identical across 
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countries and equal to the population density of England at industrialization. This is 





. In order to generate the disparity in TFP that Parente and Prescott (2004) 
use to explain the staggered timing of industrialization (TFP effect), I allow the TFP 
growth rate to vary for all countries after 1800.  
 In order to do so, it is necessary to make several other, less restrictive, 
assumptions. The first assumption is that the TFP growth rate and population density are 
the only sources of heterogeneity between countries. This implies that 
! a ,o















 is constant across countries prior to industrialization. The 
next assumption is that !
i,t<1800
= 1 , while !
i,t>1800




















= 61.67 , the density at 
which England industrialized.  
 Contradictions to this last assumption exist, as England was not the densest 
country in the world in 1800. More dense countries, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Italy, and Japan cannot be examined using this analysis and provide evidence of 
additional heterogeneities that need to be accounted for to truly explain the timing of 
industrialization.  
 These assumptions follow from the specification for TFP in Section II. Given that, 
with the exception of population density, countries begin identically, it is not until 
England industrializes that additional heterogeneity can occur. When England, and 








 and becomes an opportunity for international technology dissipation, 
represented by !
i,t
" 1 . Since, TFP varies across sectors due solely to international 
dispersion, I refer to this as the open economy effect.  
 When an economy is opened in this manner, the time-independent critical 









!m( ) " a ,0
























12   (2.20) 
and is no longer identical across countries. This open economy TFP effect is used to 
explain the disparity between (2.19), the density at which a closed economy would 
industrialize, and the density that a country is observed to industrialize at, (2.20). 
V. Empirics 
 In this section, I consider the two dynamic variables in (2.11), ! a ,t
!
m ,t
( )  and NtL( ) , 
and determine their relative effects in enabling the population density to reach its critical 
level. To do so I define a new variable, D
i,t























   (2.21) 
where the ratio of agrarian to manufacturing TFP growth, !a ,i
!
m ,i
( ) , is calibrated so that 
(2.20) matches the observed density at industrialization and is constant between 1800 and 
!
i
, the date of industrialization of country i .14 
                                                
14 This calibration is chosen since it is not possible to directly measure manufacturing TFP prior to the 
existence of a manufacturing sector. Additionally, historical data is highly inaccurate and there does not 
exist common accounting across countries for the time periods in question. 
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 There are two components of change in this distance that occur over time: the 
TFP effect, caused by Ni ,t
L
*
 decreasing due to decreases in ! a ,i ,t
!
m ,i ,t
, and the population effect, 
caused by Ni ,t
L
 increasing due to population growth. We can decompose movement 





Figure 2.3: Path to Industrialization: Switzerland 
 
 
 Figures 2.3 and 2.4 depict the TFP effect and population density effect for 
Switzerland, a country in which TFP aided the path to industrialization, !a ,i
!
m ,i
< 1 , and 
Germany, a country for which TFP slowed the path to industrialization, !a ,i
!
m ,i
> 1 . 
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Figure 2.4: Path to Industrialization: Germany 
 
 The relative population density effect is defined as the ratio of the increase in 
population density between 1800 and industrialization to the distance from 
industrialization in 1800.  The model lacks an explanation for why a country would 
absorb technology in the agrarian sector as opposed to the manufacturing sector (as in 
Figure 2.4) 
 The relative population density effect for a cross section of countries is presented 
in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 for total land and arable land, respectively.  
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Table 2.1: Population Effect Relative To TFP Effect: Total Land15 
                                                
15 Source: Author’s own calculations. Approximate years of industrialization were calculated from Bairoch 
(1982) by matching level of industrialization per capita to UK in 1800. Land area reflects national borders 

























United Kingdom 1800 1.0030 61.67 61.67 - -
Switzerland 1830 1.0077 43.75 55.00 0.9989 63%
Belgium 1834 1.0056 108.33 131.00 - -
US 1842 1.0304 3.43 12.07 0.9884 15%
France 1845 1.0044 52.73 64.18 1.0003 128%
Germany 1862 1.0082 50.00 83.00 1.0014 283%
Sweden 1863 1.0070 5.56 8.64 0.9907 6%
Norway 1880 1.0097 2.81 6.09 0.9914 6%
Austria-Hungary 1883 1.0066 36.76 63.47 1.0001 107%
Netherlands 1885 1.0092 66.67 145.00 - -
Finland 1887 1.0125 2.35 6.94 0.9925 8%
Denmark 1888 1.0087 25.00 53.50 0.9995 78%
Canada 1889 1.0255 0.21 1.96 0.9884 3%
Italy 1896 1.0058 63.33 110.67 - -
Russia 1903 1.0103 7.55 21.59 0.9969 26%
Spain 1903 1.0048 23.00 37.84 0.9986 38%
Japan 1907 1.0053 75.68 132.97 - -
Australia 1909 1.0291 0.03 0.59 0.9873 1%
New Zealand 1915 1.0157 0.74 4.44 0.9932 6%
Bulgaria 1920 1.0080 18.18 47.27 0.9993 67%
Portugal 1921 1.0056 30.56 60.22 0.9999 95%
Greece 1923 1.0078 17.31 45.23 0.9992 63%
South Africa 1931 1.0139 1.18 7.24 0.9951 10%
Yugoslavia 1932 1.0081 18.27 53.23 0.9997 81%
Romania 1942 1.0073 22.92 64.75 1.0001 108%
Brazil 1956 1.0211 0.29 7.61 0.9960 12%
Mexico 1957 1.0121 2.75 18.12 0.9977 26%
China 1971 1.0052 34.38 82.90 1.0005 178%
India and Pakistan 1980 1.0082 43.84 191.47 1.0019 828%
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Table 2.2: Population Effect Relative To TFP Effect: Arable Land16 
 
 The mean effect across the sample is 93% when total land is considered and 
increases to 295% when only arable land is taken into account. The means are skewed 
due to the large population density effects in small number of cases in which the TFP 
effect is negative. Therefore, the median is a less biased and more accurate representation 
of the data. The median population density effects are 51% and 49%, respectively.  
 Figure 2.5 examines China and India, two countries experiencing very large TFP 
effects. The implication of these effects is they must have absorbed TFP in the agrarian 
                                                














(persons/ sq. km 
arable land)







United Kingdom 1800 0.15 265.46 265.46 - -
Switzerland 1830 0.04 441.47 554.99 - -
Belgium 1834 0.03 395.09 477.75 - -
US 1842 1.75 19.04 67.01 0.9902 19%
France 1845 0.55 158.34 192.74 0.9979 32%
Germany 1862 0.36 150.92 250.53 0.9997 87%
Sweden 1863 0.45 81.70 127.12 0.9965 25%
Norway 1880 0.32 104.17 225.69 0.9994 75%
Austria-Hungary 1883 0.17 107.94 186.35 0.9987 50%
Netherlands 1885 0.03 1019.37 2217.13 - -
Finland 1887 0.34 33.71 99.44 0.9966 28%
Denmark 1888 0.04 44.85 95.98 0.9965 23%
Canada 1889 2.40 4.56 42.85 0.9939 15%
Italy 1896 0.30 239.81 419.03 1.0014 699%
Russia 1903 4.77 105.26 301.16 1.0004 122%
Spain 1903 0.50 84.62 139.22 0.9981 30%
Japan 1907 0.37 623.87 1096.23 - -
Australia 1909 7.69 0.38 8.62 0.9906 3%
New Zealand 1915 0.27 12.77 76.63 0.9968 25%
Bulgaria 1920 0.11 60.73 157.89 0.9987 47%
Portugal 1921 0.09 176.72 348.31 1.0007 193%
Greece 1923 0.13 84.63 221.18 0.9996 76%
South Africa 1931 1.27 9.76 59.87 0.9966 20%
Yugoslavia 1932 0.26 93.16 271.45 1.0001 103%
Romania 1942 0.24 58.03 163.97 0.9990 51%
Brazil 1956 8.51 4.66 120.72 0.9985 44%
Mexico 1957 2.00 21.72 143.13 0.9988 50%
China 1971 9.60 258.26 622.81 1.0015 5065%
India and Pakistan 1980 4.22 100.16 437.44 1.0008 204%
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rather than the manufacturing sector. This is confirmed in the data, as Figure 2.5 shows 
that both China and India experienced declines in the per capita level of industrialization. 
This occurred while output per capita remains constant indicated a decline in 
manufacturing sector relative to the industrial sector. This is consistent with Tables 2.1 
and 2.2, which imply that TFP changes slowed industrialization in these countries. 
Figure 2.5: Per Capita Level of Industrialization, China17 
VI. Conclusion 
 This paper explores the role of population density in triggering the onset of 
industrialization. I find that TFP is not as important as others have suggested and that 
                                                
17 Per capita level of industrialization taken from Bairoch (1982) and defined as manufacturing output per 
capita. 
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population density is capable of accounting for approximately half of the timing of 
industrialization across countries. 
 Within the same framework as set for by Hansen and Prescott (2002), I show that 
the dynamics of population density alone are capable of generating the transition between 
pre-industrial and industrialized growth paths that are consistent with what is observed in 
the data.  
 Furthermore, with additional specifications that are consistent with theory of 
Lucas (1998) and the calibrations of Parente and Prescott (2004), population density 
increases are found to account for nearly half of the movement toward industrialization, 
depending on the measure of land. 
 Most importantly, this paper provides a way to apply the framework of Hansen 
and Prescott (2002) to a cross section of countries such that the timing of industrialization 
across countries is consistent with the data.  In the final line of Hansen and Prescott 
(2002), the authors speculate: 
The fact that the industrial revolution happened first in England in the 
early nineteenth century rather than contemporaneously or earlier in 
China, where the stock of useable knowledge may have actually been 
higher, is due perhaps to the institutions and policies in place in these two 
countries. 
Here it is seen that China’s lag behind England can be attributed to its lower population 
density, making it unnecessary to explore the effects of non-measurable quantities such 
as institutions and policies. 
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 While this paper is focused primarily on the industrial revolution, the ability to 
express distance to industrialization in terms of two state variables, ! a ,t
!
m ,t
( )  and NtL( ) , 
provides a framework to examine more modern cases of industrialization. Additionally, 
the relative levels of the two state variables at industrialization may be relevant for 
explaining the different rates of growth countries experience upon industrialization. 
Supplemental Proposition: Pre-Industrial Steady State 
 Proposition: If there is constant population growth while only the agrarian 











 then !  an equilibrium sequence of land prices such that capital, 
consumption and output per worker are constant. 
 Proof: If !  a series of prices that obey the law of motion for land prices, (2.14), 




, then the proposition must be true.  












, it can be seen from (2.15) that 




 will make the proposition hold. 
 The per capita level of capital associated with this steady state is the non-negative 
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Supplemental Proposition: Conditions on Industrialization 
 Proposition: For any ! m ,t+1 ! m ,t
!
a ,t+1 ! a ,t
> 1
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1# µ+$( )  or 
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m ,t+1 ! m ,t
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*  such that for N
L
( ) > N
L
( )
*  the industrial sector will be employed. 
 Proof: From a time at which industrialization has not occurred, in order for (2.11) 
to become satisfied at some time, it must be that there exists some !  such that !t > " , 
the left hand side is growing faster than the left hand side.  Differentiating (2.11) with 
respect to time and simplifying, yields the condition that industrialization will eventually 
occur if  
ln !( ) N0
L( ) >
" m ,t+1
" m ,t( )
# t
1#(µ+$ )
ln !( ) #
ln " m ,t+1 " m ,t( )














 Since the right hand side approaches zero for all !
m,t+1
!
m,t( ) " 1 , the first part of 
the proposition is proven. 
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   (2.28) 
proving the second part. 
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Chapter Three 







 A sequential competitive equilibrium is presented to solve an infinite horizon 
two-sector neoclassical growth mode where the two sectors are chosen to represent the 
agrarian and manufacturing sectors of the economy. In this framework, industrialization 
is seen to be the relaxing of the non-negativity constrain on the manufacturing sector. It is 
seen that every country possesses a critical population density upon which it will 
transition from using solely an agrarian production technology to employing both 
agrarian and manufacturing technologies. This transition is result of a discrete change in 
the decision to invest in manufacturing capital. Furthermore, the ability of agents to 
anticipate industrialization is shown to increase the rate of capital accumulation and 
hasten the onset of the manufacturing sector.  
Keywords: economic development, population density, capital accumulation,   
  industrialization 




 In this paper, I explore the role of population density in an infinite horizon version 
of the unified growth theory of Hansen and Prescott (2002) and show that similar to the 
overlapped generations case, if a country possesses sufficient population density, the 
manufacturing technology will always be employed. In addition, anticipation of the 
implementation of the industrial sector will increase the rate of accumulation of capital 
and hasten industrialization. 
 I show that every country possesses a critical population density upon which it 
will transition from using solely an agrarian production technology to employing both 
agrarian and manufacturing technologies. This transition is shown to be the result in a 
change in the investment decision on manufacturing capital. For the purposes of this 
paper, industrialization is defined as this transition.  
 The stylized facts typically associated with this literature are two-fold: short run 
correlations with population and long run time trends. By examining long run 
correlations with population density, noticeable changes are seen to occur at a critical 
population density. Figures 3.1, 3.3, and 3.5 present a review of these long run time 
trends for real wages, land prices, and agrarian labor force in England while Figures 3.2, 
3.4, and 3.6 plot the same variables against population density over the same time 
interval. 
 While population density is strictly increasing in time, this monotonic 
transformation provides new insights. For all three variables, a more distinct change in 
trend is observed at industrialization when population density is the dependent variable. 
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This lends credibility to the theory that population density is the underlying explanatory 
variable. 



















                                                
18 Data is from England 1520-1911 and taken from Clark (2002). Agrarian labor is measured as male farm 
workers (in millions). Population is measured in millions of persons. Wage (of farm workers) and rental 
rate of (farm) land are both normalized to 100 in 1865. 
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Figure 3.2: Agrarian Labor as a Function of Population Density 
 
 






Figure 3.4: Rental Rate of Land as a Function of Population Density 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Real Wage as a Function of Time 
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Figure 3.6: Real Wage as a Function of Population Density 
 
 
 The next section describes the environment. Section III presents a sequential 
equilibrium for a simplified version of the model and Section IV presents the full 
sequential equilibrium. In Section V, a numerical solution algorithm is presented and the 
results shown. Section VI concludes. 
II. Environment 
 This closed model economy is an infinitely lived agent variation of the overlapping 
generation model described by Hansen and Prescott (2002) and the previous chapters.  
 There are three resources in the economy: land, labor, and capital. There are two 













1#µ#" , that uses capital, labor, and land, and industrial firms that have 









1#" , that utilizes only capital 
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, agrarian firms demand L
t
units of land, K
a,t  
units of capital, and N
a,t
units of labor, respectively, at the beginning of each period. 




, industrial firms demand K
m,t
 units of 
capital and N
m,t
units of labor. Both production technologies produce an identical 
aggregate good and all firms face perfectly competitive markets for labor, land, and 
capital, where capital depreciates by !  each period. There are no fixed costs and no 
savings technology is available to firms. Therefore, each sector can be reduced to a single 
representative firm that solves a static maximization problem and operates only in periods 




" ! t  
where ! = "1#(µ+$ ) . 
 There is a continuum of ex-ante identical, infinitely lived agents with preferences 




# . New agents are born each period such that Nt+1 = !Nt . Agents enter each 
period with a stock of agrarian capital, k
a,t




, and a unit 
supply of labor rent l
t
!X  units of land, ka,t  units of capital, and na,t ! 0,1[ ]  units of 
labor to agrarian firms; rent capital km,t  and nm,t ! 0,1[ ]  units of labor to industrial firms; 
consume c
t















,Ka,0 ,Km,0 ,N0{ }!X " ! +
4 , are given and where X  is assumed to be 
closed and convex. 
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III. Simple Example 
 In this simple version of the model, there is no capital, ! = " = 0 , and the 




















   (3.1) 












    (3.2) 
 Due to constant returns to scale, there are no profits and the optimization 
















      (3.4) 
r
L ,t













 and N{ }
t=0
! , agents take prices qt ,!a,t ,!m,t ,rL ,t{ }t=0
"
 as given and 
solve  
max
na ,t ,nm ,t ,ct ,lt+1





ct + qtlt+1 =$a,tna,t +$m,tnm,t + rL ,t + qt( )lt
0 % na,t ,nm,t % 1







   (3.6) 
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 such that households, (3.6), and firms, (3.1) and (3.2), 


































   (3.10) 
 The market clearing conditions also represent a rational expectations requirement 
for individuals. 
 The relevant state variables for an agent in period t  are his current stock of land, 
l
t
, the aggregate stock of land, L
t
, and the total number of agents, N
t
. When capital is 





; and the aggregate agrarian capital, K
a,t
, and manufacturing 
capital, K
m,t
 will also be relevant. 




qt+1 + rL ,t+1
ct+1
+ "
L ,t      (3.11) 
!







= 0     (3.12) 
where !
L ,t
 is the multiplier on the constraint l
t+1
! 0 , !
na,t
 is the multiplier on the 
constraint n
a,t
! 0 , and !
nm,t
 is the multiplier on the constraint 1! n
a,t
" 0 . 
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 From market clearing, it is not possible for l
t+1






 Lemma 1: If L
t
> 0 , then n
a,t
> 0 . 
 Proof: Suppose that n
a,t
= 0 . Then !
na,t




< 0  and 
N
a.t















. However, for all L
t
> 0 , the right hand side is infinite, while the 
left hand side is bounded. Thus, ! L
t
> 0  it must be that !
na,t




> 0 . 
q.e.d. 
 Lemma 2: There exists some Nt
L
t
( )  such that when ! a = ! m and NtL
t











< 1 . 
 Proof: Suppose that n
a,t
= 1 , then !
nm,t




















     (3.13) 
Since the left hand side is decreasing in Nt
L
t
( ) , there must exist a minimum NtL
t
( )  at which 
(3.13) can no longer hold. q.e.d. 
 This gives the condition that the constraint on manufacturing capital is not 













     (3.14) 
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Combing this result with Lemma 1, (3.14) is the condition for which nether constraint is 
binding and both technologies are in use. 









1!µ , which will be seen to 
be the same condition derived from the overlapping generations model of chapter two. 
 Given that both technologies are in use, !
na,t
= 0  and !
nm,t
= 0 , (3.14) is satisfied, 















     (3.15) 
 Taking (3.14) and (3.15) as given, households are indifference about n
a,t
! 0,1[ ] .  
Thus there exists an equilibrium where there is consistency of aggregate and individual 
decisions, (3.9), and  
 Na,t =



























    (3.16) 
IV. Sequential Competitive Equilibrium 
 With the return of capital, the representative agrarian firm solves the sequence of 
one period problems 
max
























while the representative industrial firm solves the sequence of one period problems 
max
K
















   (3.18) 
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Due to constant returns to scale, there are no profits and factors will earn a rent equal to 





,ka,0 ,km,0{ }  and Nt{ }t=0














 as given and solve 
max
na ,t ,nm ,t ,ct ,lt+1 ,ka ,t+1 ,km ,t+1





ct + qtlt+1 + ka,t+1 + km,t+1 =$a,tna,t +$m,tnm,t +
rKa,t +1% &( )ka,t + rKm,t +1% &( )km,t + rL ,t + qt( )lt
0 ' na,t ,nm,t ' 1
na,t + nm,t = 1
  (3.19) 
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1#$ + 1# %( ) K
a,t
+ K














   (3.22) 
 Taking the first order conditions of (3.19) and substituting in some of the 




qt+1 + rL ,t+1
ct+1
+ "
L ,t      (3.23) 
!
























     (3.26) 
where !
ka,t
 is the multiplier on the constraint; k
a,t+1
! 0 , !
km,t
 is the multiplier on the 
constraint k
m,t+1






 follow from the simple example. 
 Lemma 3: Given that ct+1
c
t
 is bounded and L
t
> 0  for all t , then n
a,t
> 0  and 
k
a,t+1
> 0 . 
 Proof: Suppose that n
a,t
= 0 . Then !
na,t































1" µ+&( ) > 0 . However, for all 
L
t
> 0  or K
a,t
> 0 , the second term is infinite, while the first term is bounded. Therefore, 
it must be that !
na,t
= 0  and n
a,t
> 0 .  
 Similarly, suppose that for some t , k
a,t+1
= 0 . Then !
ka,t





























> 0 , the left hand side is infinite while the right hand side is bounded so it is 
the case that investment in agrarian capital is always positive and !
ka,t
= 0  and k
a,t+1












 is the unique K
a












   (3.27) 
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 Lemma 4: If K
m,t
> 0 , then n
m,t
> 0 . 
 Proof: Suppose that n
m,t
= 0  and K
m,t
> 0 . Then !
na,t





























1" µ+&( ) < 0 . As in the agrarian sector, if 
K
m,t
> 0 , the first term is infinite while the second term is bounded and it is the case that 
n
m,t
> 0  whenever K
m,t
> 0 . q.e.d. 
 When neither labor constraint is binding, both technologies are in use, and wages 
are equalized across sectors. We then have N
a,t
 is the unique N
a
 that solves: 

















1! µ+%( )   (3.28) 
Using these results, we can obtain an aggregate decision rule for labor allocation. 
Na,t =
0 if Ka,t = 0







     (3.29) 
where N
a
 solves (3.28) and n
a,t
 follows from (3.9). 
 Since non-zero labor will always be allocated to a sector with non-zero capital, 
the decision rule on n
a,t
 is not the condition that determines industrialization. Rather it is 
the capital investment decisions that determine whether production occurs in a given 
sector in the future periods. 
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 Lemma 5: Given that ct+1
c
t
 is bounded, there exists a critical density that varies in 




>d t,K( ) , then k
m,t+1
> 0 , else 
k
m,t+1
= 0 . 
 Proof: Suppose K
m,t+1





















> 0 . Since from Lemma 3, we know K
a,t+1
> 0 ; in the limit 
K
m,t+1


















1$ µ+%( )   (3.30) 
as must the return to labor, (3.28). 
 Dividing (3.30) by (3.28) and rearranging, it is possible to obtain agrarian and 












µ( ) 1"##( ) + 1" !µ( ) 1"##( )( )Ka,t









µ( ) 1"##( ) + 1" !µ( ) 1"##( )( )Ka,t
   (3.32) 
Substituting in for r
Km,t
 and using (3.31) and (3.32), it can be seen that !
m,t













*L( ) µ+( ) !1$!( )   (3.33) 
q.e.d. 
This is the corresponding condition to the critical population density from chapter two.  
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= 0 , and industrial 
capital investment, K
m,t+1
, is the unique K
m













    (3.34) 
Similarly, K
m,t+1
 can also be determined from (3.27) and (3.30). 
V. Unbalanced Growth Path 
 A balanced growth path does not exist for this economy. As seen in Landon-Lane 
and Robertson (2005), Restuccia (2004), and Caselli and Coleman (2001), a balanced 
growth path only exists in the case that TFP growth in the agrarian sector exceeds that of 
the industrial sector. Instead, the economy will approach a balanced growth path only in 





 is large enough so that both technologies are employed, (3.28) and 





t( )  and Nm Nt ,Kt( )  follow from (3.31) and (3.32), and it can 
be shown that upon industrialization, in the special case where the labor share of output is 
identical across sectors, the aggregate supply of agrarian capital evolves with the ratio of 














L     (3.35) 
Furthermore, since (3.27) always holds, the sequence for the aggregate supply of capital, 
K
t{ }t=0
























t+1 # Ka,t+1( )
%

































1# µ+"( ) +1# &( )
(3.36) 
for all t . 







1" µ+#( ) 1"$     (3.37) 
follows from the assumption that the model approaches a purely manufacturing economy 
in the limit. Given K
0
,N
0{ }, Nt ,! a,t ,! m,t{ }
t=0
T +1
, (3.37) in conjunction with (3.36) 



























. With the exception of !
i,t
, which was specified 
previously, the parameters follow from Parente and Prescott (2004): ! = .4 , ! = .1 , 
µ = .6 , ! = .97 , ! = .06 .19 
 Figures 3.7 and 3.8 depict the growth paths of capital and output respectively, 
broken down by sectors. From this diagram it can be seen that that in the limit, the multi-
sector economy does approach that of a purely manufacturing economy, justifying the 
limiting condition of the solution algorithm. It is also interesting to note that in the limit, 
                                                









industrialization. Since the data, from Bairoch (1981), and theory, Lucas (2002), imply that TFP should 
increase more rapidly in both sectors following industrialization, equality is assumed. 
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the capital to labor ratio in the manufacturing sector approaches a level four times that of 
the agrarian sector. 
Figure 3.7: Growth Path of Capital 
 

















Figure 3.8: Output per Capita 
 
 
 In contrast to chapter two, capital per capita is not constant prior to 
industrialization. Instead, agents increase the rate of capital accumulation in anticipation 
of the manufacturing technology, hastening the onset of industrialization. Figure 3.9 
depicts this by contrasting the capital path in this model to one in which agents lack 







Figure 3.9: Capital Accumulation, Effect of Foresight 
 Table 3.1 compares this capital path to the data and finds that while the model 
accurately matches the capital growth immediately following industrialization, it 
underestimates capital growth both prior to industrialization and significantly following 
industrialization. The latter expected, since the calibration of the TFP growth path was 
chosen to simplify computation. The TFP path in Kahn (2007b), which accounts for more 
rapid growth in both sectors following industrialization, would more accurately match the 
data. However, the underestimation of capital growth prior to industrialization is not 
expected, especially since agents have perfect foresight. This finding may indicate that 
some additional aggregate forces played a role in causing industrialization.  
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Table 3.1: Growth Rate of Capital Stock, Great Britain20 
 
 Alternatively, this underestimation could be corrected if industrialization began 
slightly before 1800. As can be seen in Table 3.2, if the model is changed so that 
industrialization occurred in 1780, then the growth rate of capital from 1760-1800 
increases to 49% without having a substantive effect on the other periods.  
Table 3.2: Growth Rate of Capital Stock, 1780 Industrialization 
 
 Figure 3.10 plots the growth path of labor, broken down by sector, concurrently 
with the critical population density. Despite not being explicitly used in the solution 
algorithm, population density is seen to reach the critical population density at 
industrialization. Due to the manner in which it is calculated as a limiting condition, the 






. Therefore, the critical 
population density is not depicted following industrialization. 
                                                
20 Data obtained from Feinstein (1978). Defined as Gross Stock of Domestic Reproducible Fixed Capital, 
Great Britain. 
Year
Capital Stock, Data           
(mil. GBP at 1851-60 prices)
Growth Rate of 
Capital Stock, Data
Real Captial Stock, 
Model (K1800=100)
Growth Rate of Capital 
Stock, Model
1760 490 - 84 -
1800 730 49% 100 19%
1830 1180 62% 159 59%
1860 2310 96% 243 53%
Year
Capital Stock, Data            
(mil. GBP at 1851-60 prices)
Growth Rate of 
Capital Stock, Data
Real Captial Stock, 
Model (K1800=100)
Growth Rate of Capital 
Stock, Model
1760 490 - 91 -
1800 730 49% 135 49%
1830 1180 62% 213 58%
1860 2310 96% 309 45%
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 As in data, Figure 3.2, the agrarian workforce increases prior to industrialization 
and then experiences a modest decline with the implementation of the manufacturing 
sector.  
  Figure 3.10: Labor Distribution and Critical Population Density 
 
 Also matching the data, in Figures 3.4 and 3.6 respectively, are the real rental rate 







  Figure 3.11: Real Rental Rate of Land  
Figure 3.12: Real Wage 
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 The return to capital, Figure 3.13, experiences the least movement of the factor 
prices, with the real return to capital settling at a level 4% higher after industrialization 
than before. This is consistent with the lack of long-term trend in real interest rates. The 
only abnormality is the slight drop in capital immediately prior to industrialization, which 
is a product of the increased rate of capital accumulation immediately prior to 
industrialization.  
  Figure 3.13: Real Return to Capital 
 













+1" #( ) " rL ,t+1      (3.38) 
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Any sequence of land prices, qt{ }t=1
! , that solves (3.38) for all t , will be viable for the 
equilibrium, and Figure 3.10 plots this sequence of land prices for the model. 
Figure 3.14: Real Price of Land 
VI. Conclusion 
 This paper has shown that in an infinite horizon framework, a perfectly 
competitive, Ricardian model with constant returns to scale agrarian and manufacturing 
technologies possess a critical population density upon which the manufacturing 
technology will be implemented. 
 Unlike in the case of an overlapping generations model, it is not possible to obtain 
a closed form solution for the critical population density. Instead, is an endogenous 
component exists. The other change that occurs with the shift to this framework is that 
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agents adjust capital holdings in anticipation of industrialization. This manifests in an 
increase in capital per capita prior to the increase in output per capita that marks the onset 
of industrialization.  
 This increase in capital stock has the effect of hastening the onset of 
industrialization in comparison to a model in which agents lack foresight or are otherwise 
unable to deviate from the Malthusian steady state prior to the implementation of the 
industrial technology. 
 Despite this growth in capital per capita immediately prior to industrialization, the 
model still underestimates the capital growth seen in the data during this period, but 
matches it accurately immediately following industrialization. While there are many such 
explanations for this underestimation, one way to correct for this difference is to set 1780 
as the starting date of industrialization, rather than 1800. With this new starting date, the 
growth rate of capital predicted by the model misses the data by only 0.4% in the 30 
years preceding industrialization and 5.5% in the 30 years following industrialization. 
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